We present a novel approach for proving secrecy properties of security protocols by mechanized flow analysis. In contrast to existing tools for proving secrecy by abstract interpretation, our tool enjoys cryptographic soundness in the strong sense of blackbox reactive simulatability/UC which entails that secrecy properties proven by our tool are automatically guaranteed to hold for secure cryptographic implementations of the analyzed protocol, with respect to the more fine-grained cryptographic secrecy definitions and adversary models.
INTRODUCTION
Security proofs of cryptographic protocols are known to be difficult and the automation of such proofs has been studied soon after the first protocols were developed. From the start, the actual cryptographic operations in such proofs were idealized into so-called Dolev-Yao models, following [22, 23, 39] , e.g., see [31, 47, 4, 38, 44, 13] . This idealization simplifies proof construction by freeing proofs from cryptographic details such as computational restrictions, probabilistic behavior, and error probabilities. Conducting secrecy proofs by typing based on these abstractions has shown to be a particularly salient technique as it allowed for elegant and fully automated proofs, often even for an unbounded number of sessions.
A type system was recently presented in [35] that combines the conciseness of language-based reasoning in Dolev-Yao models with strong computational soundness guarantees, i.e., if an abstract proPermission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. tocol typechecks then its cryptographic realization provably keeps the quantities handed to it by the protocol users (payload data) secret in the computational sense. Such computational soundness guarantees of abstract proofs have recently been identified as central for gaining trustworthy guarantees of security protocols: the computational model strives for stronger, more fine-grained security notions and furthermore considers a more realistic adversary that is allowed to perform arbitrary bitstring manipulations as long as they can be performed in probabilistic polynomial-time. However, despite being the first type system that allows for abstract, computationally sound reasoning under active attacks, the major drawback of [35] was that type inference was not considered. As a consequence, this work did not entail an automated procedure for analyzing secrecy aspects of cryptographic protocols with cryptographic soundness guarantees, which arguably is the central goal of unifying the advantages of both approaches.
We remedy this shortcoming by presenting a mechanized approach for soundly proving secrecy of payload data in cryptographic protocols by analysing the possible flows of data during the execution of the protocol. Our approach is capable of reasoning about a comprehensive language for expressing protocols, in particular handling symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption, allows for more precise analyses compared with the type system of [35] , is fully automated, and produces proofs for an unbounded number of sessions in the presence of an active adversary.
Our results (and the one of [35] as well) rely on a variant of the Dolev-Yao model of Backes, Pfitzmann, and Waidner, henceforth called the BPW model, which has been shown to be computationally sound in the strong sense of of blackbox reactive simulatability (BRSIM). The security notion of BRSIM means that one system (here, the cryptographic realization) can be plugged into arbitrary protocols instead of another system (here, the BPW model) [45, 18] . While first security proofs of several common protocols have been hand-crafted using the BPW model [8, 6] , recent work has shown that the BPW model is accessible to theorem proving techniques as well [48] . Our work shows that soundly proving secrecy properties in a fully automated manner is possible using the BPW model, and it identifies cryptographically sound secrecy by typing as a promising direction for future work in general. In particular, our line complements the large number of existing works that aims at establishing computational soundness of Dolev-Yao models without considering secrecy by typing, cf. the section on related work for more details.
The analysis presented in this paper builds on the spi-calculusstyle language, its deterministic semantics and the corresponding type system from [35] and is inspired by methods from control flow analysis. It works by collecting for each defined variable at each protocol point the possible shapes of terms that this variable may point to, including the possible creation points of the atomic subterms. The same information is also collected for channels between participants for encryption keys, thus yielding information which terms may be communicated over which channel, and which terms may be encrypted with which keys by honest participants, respectively. Finally, the same abstraction is also collected for terms that the adversary may learn during the run of the protocol.
There are a couple of noteworthy points. First, all inputs from the adversary are modeled using a single abstract value, thus freeing the analyser from the necessity to model every new term that the adversary may construct. Instead, we consider explicit rules for decomposing this abstract value, i.e., the adversary's input, which allows us to keep the description of the adversary's knowledge finite. Secondly, parts of the protocol statically following a public-key decryption are analysed twice -once assuming that the ciphertext was created by an honest participant and once assuming that it was created by the adversary. The distinction of these two cases (which was already present in [2] and also in [35] ) is important for the precision of the analyser. Thirdly, we collect not only the possible values of variables but also relationships between them. Whenever certain operations restrict the set of possible values of some variables, we exploit these recorded relationships in order to restrict the set of values of related variables as well. This collection of relationships is reminiscent of shape analysis [51] , although our task is considerably simpler here than a full shape analysis because we do not have destructive updates. We record the relationships between variables by collecting a set of constraints that their abstractions must satisfy.
Our prover (consisting of constraint generator and solver) has been implemented in O'Caml and can be downloaded at http: //www.ut.ee/ ∼ peeter l/research/brsiman.
Related Work
Early work on linking Dolev-Yao-style symbolic models and cryptography [5, 28, 32, 29] only considered passive attacks, and therefore cannot make general statements about protocols.
The security notion of BRSIM was first defined generally in [45] , based on simulatability definitions for secure (one-step) function evaluation. It was extended in [46, 18] , the latter with somewhat different details and called UC (universal composability), and has been widely applied to prove individual cryptographic systems secure and to derive general theoretical results. In particular, BR-SIM/UC allows for plugging one system into arbitrary protocols instead of another system while retaining essentially arbitrary security properties [45, 18, 10] .
A cryptographic justification of a Dolev-Yao model in the sense of BRSIM/UC was first given in [11] with extensions in [12, 9] . Later papers [40, 34, 19] considered to what extent restrictions to weaker security properties or less general protocol classes allow simplifications compared with [11] : Laud [34] has presented cryptographic foundations for a Dolev-Yao model of symmetric encryption but specific to certain confidentiality properties where the surrounding protocols are restricted to straight-line programs. Warinschi et al. [40, 20] have presented cryptographic underpinnings for a Dolev-Yao model of public-key encryption, yet for a restricted class of protocols and protocol properties that can be analyzed using this primitive. Baudet, Cortier, and Kremer [14] have established the soundness of specific classes of equational theories in a Dolev-Yao model under passive attacks. Canetti and Herzog [19] have shown that a Dolev-Yao-style symbolic analysis can be conducted using the framework of universal composability for a restricted class of protocols, namely mutual authentication and key exchange protocols with the additional constraint that the protocols must be expressible as loop-free programs using public-key encryption as their only cryptographic operation. We stress that none of these works build on type inference for proving secrecy properties of security protocols.
The work that comes closest to our work is the work of Laud [35] who designed a type system for proving secrecy aspects of security protocols based on the BPW model. He shows that if an abstract protocol typechecks in his system, then its cryptographic realization provably keeps the quantities handed to it by the protocol users secret in the computational sense. The proof of this fact exploits the BRSIM/UC soundness result of [11, 9, 10] for carrying over symbolic proofs of secrecy in the BPW model to the actual cryptographic realization, similar to the present paper. However, type inference has not been implemented yet in this paper so that the paper did not entail a mechanized procedure for soundly proving secrecy aspects of security protocols.
Efforts are also under way to formulate syntactic calculi with a probabilistic, polynomial-time semantics, including approaches based on process algebra [41, 37] , security logics [30, 21] and cryptographic games [15] . In particular, Datta et al. [21] have proposed a promising logical deduction system to prove computational security properties. We are not aware of any implementations of these frameworks, except for Blanchet's [15] , who has recently presented an automated tool for proving secrecy properties of security protocols based on transforming cryptographic games. This line of work is orthogonal to the work of justifying Dolev-Yao models, which offer a higher level of abstractions and thus much simpler proofs where applicable, so that proofs of larger systems can be automated.
Let us also mention some of the work in the area of type systems for cryptographic protocol analysis. The first type system of this kind was proposed by Abadi [1] , which could be used for verifying the secrecy of payloads or nonces in the protocols using only symmetric encryption. This type system, as well as all the remaining ones that we describe work in the Dolev-Yao model. The type system was extended to cope with asymmetric encryption by Abadi and Blanchet [2] . Abadi and Blanchet [3] further generalized this type system to handle generic cryptographic primitives. The type system of Abadi has also been extended by Gordon and Jeffrey [25, 26, 27] to check for integrity properties. Finally, a static program analysis [33] and a type system [36] exist that work directly in the computational model, handling programs containing symmetric encryption, both for passive adversaries only.
Abstract interpretation, which is in most cases automatable using data flow analysis, has also been considered for the analysis of cryptographic protocols within the Dolev-Yao model. See for example [16] and the references contained therein.
Structure of the paper
We start by describing our (machine-based) execution model and the language used to program these machines for expressing security protocols in Sec. 2. We continue in Sec. 3 with the description of the analysis. In particular, we give the correctness theorem stating under which conditions the results of the abstract analysis entail computational security of a cryptographic protocol. Sec. 4 describes the implementation of our tool and its applicability to common security protocols from the literature. In Sec. 5 we give the main technical lemma, similar to subject reduction, used to prove the previously given correctness theorem.
EXECUTION MODEL
We use the same setup of a system as in [35] . In short, the BPW model (sometimes also called abstract cryptographic library in the following corresponding to the original title of [11] ) for n honest users is implemented by a machine THn which has input ports inu i ? to receive commands from the i-th user, output ports outu i ! to return the results of commands and (handles of) received messages, ports ina? and outa! for the communication with the adversary, and a database of terms. The database records the structure of messages and the knowledge of messages by the parties (n users and the adversary). The users and the adversary access messages through handles, the transmission of messages involves the translation of handles. The possible commands are the construction, taking apart, and sending of messages. The protocol logic for the i-th user is implemented by a machine Pi that connects to the ports inu i ? and outu i ! and offers the ports pin u i ? and pout u i ! to the user through which it may send and receive data. An execution step of a machine Pi consists of receiving a message (either from THn or the user), performing some computations on the terms, and optionally sending a message. The machines Pi are programmed in a language resembling the spi-calculus, defined below.
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Here x-s are variables, e-s are expressions, I-s are input processes, P -s are output processes, and -s are labels for program points and expressions of interest. No label may occur twice in the protocol text, nor can a variable be defined twice or used before being defined. The language contains public-key and symmetric-key encryption as the cryptographic primitives (as well as nonces). A public and secret key pair is created by the expression keypair, the public key is extracted by pubkey. A level i is associated with each symmetric key to prevent encryption cycles (and make the proof relating THn and its concrete implementation go through); a symmetric key may only encrypt keys of lower level. The store-and retrieve-expressions are used to convert payloads (data that can be communicated with the user) to handles and back. The expression π j i (x) extracts the i-th component from the list of length j pointed to by x. In receive c [xp](x) and sendc[xp](x), the variable x is the message and xp is the identity of the other party. The channel for the message is given by the constant abstract channel c. An abstract channel is used to group messages sent between protocol participants, as well as between the protocol user and participant (although the abstract channel does not alone determine the sender and the receiver of a message). Furthermore, the set of abstract channels Chan is partitioned into four parts, denoted Chanx, where x ∈ {s, a, i, u}. If a message is sent on an abstract channel from Chans [resp. Chana, Chani] then it means that the message travels between protocol participants over a secure (resp. authentic, insecure) channel. If a message is sent on an abstract channel from Chanu then it travels between the protocol user and the protocol participant (i.e. over one of the concrete channels pin u i or pout u i ). The variables x and xp are bound in a receive-statement. The variable x is also bound in the defaultbranch of a let-statement, but not in the else-branch, which is taken upon a failure of evaluating e.
The internal state of an inactive (i.e. not currently running) Pi consists of a list of input processes together with their execution environments, giving values to already defined variables. The "program" (or initial state) of each Pi is a list of input processes. An active Pi additionally contains the received message (together with the apparent sender and the name of the channel it was received on) and the currently running (output) process (together with its environment). When Pi receives the message, it is handed over to the first input process (!)receive c [xp](x).P with matching channel name c in its list of processes. The variables x and xp are bound to the message and the apparent sender and the process executes until it has become II or a list of input processes I * . The value II means rejecting the message -the list of input processes of Pi is not changed, the currently executing process and its environment are discarded (thereby forgetting all references to any new terms that may have been created since receiving that message) and the message is handed over to the next input process with the matching channel name in the list of input processes of Pi. When a process accepts the message, it executes until it has become a list of input processes I * . All processes in this list I * , together with the environment of the output process, are put to the list of input processes of Pi instead of or in addition of (depending on the presence of replication) the original process. When no process accepts the message, it is simply lost.
Security
The security property we are interested in is the secrecy of payloads [10] . We also considered the same property in [35] and our treatment here does not differ from that. In short, we want the system implementing the protocol (consisting of the machines P1, . . . , Pn and THn) to retain the secrecy of any payloads handed to it by the users over the ports pin u i ?. The secrecy of payloads means that the user and the adversary together cannot figure out whether the system implementing the protocol is really computing with the values received from the user or with some other values. In the definition of payload secrecy, there is a scrambler / descrambler inserted between the user and the system implementing the protocol. If it is turned on, it replaces all messages from the user to the system (i.e. all payloads) with random values; and replaces these random values, if they are sent from the system to the user, with the values received from the user again. The user (together with the adversary) has to guess whether the scrambler / descrambler is turned on. If the user cannot guess then the payloads are kept secure in the system -they do not flow from the user through the system to the adversary. A precise definition can be found in [10] and a concise description in [35] . In [35] the following five properties were stated to be sufficient for the secrecy of payloads and for the simulatability of the machine THn:
(I) the bit-strings that the machines Pi receive from the ports pin u i ? do not affect the control flow of Pi, i.e. this data is not used in the if -statements;
(II) the machines Pi may pass the bit-strings received from the user to the cryptographic library only in store-commands;
(III) the terms resulting from these store-commands will not become available to the adversary, i.e. the adversary does not get handles for these terms.
(IV) symmetric keys of order i only encrypt terms of order less than i (note that symmetric keys created by the adversary have no order and are thereby not restricted by this condition);
(V) if a symmetric key unknown to the adversary (i.e. the adversary does not have a handle to it) is used for encryption then this key will never become known to the adversary.
The analysis presented in this paper verifies that these five properties hold. A different secrecy property was also considered in [10] -the secrecy of keys generated by the system during the protocol run. We do not consider this property here, although a corresponding list of sufficient properties would not be difficult to fix (key secrecy can be considered a simpler property than payload secrecy); and these properties could also be verified by our analysis. However, this remains future work.
ANALYSIS
We set up a constraint system whose solutions upper-approximate the values flowing through the protocol. A constraint system consists of two main parts -constraint variables and the set of constraints. A constraint variable is just an identifier together with an associated domain (an upper semilattice) of possible values. A constraint is a statement of the form E ≤ C where C is a constraint variable and E is a monotone expression over constraint variables. A solution of a constraint system is a valuation, mapping each constraint variable to a value in its domain, such that all constraints are satisfied.
We will prove that any solution to our constraint system will be a safe approximation of any possible protocol run. To get the best precision, we are interested in the least solution. There are wellknown methods for finding the least solutions for constraint systems with monotone constraints.
Abstract Domain
The possible values of protocol variables are abstracted by sets of the following abstract values AV . The sets of abstract values are used as domains for certain constraint variables below.
Here AV I contains the possible abstractions of payloads -they may be either public (X P ) or secret (X S ). The addresses of the communication partners (variable xp in send-and receive-commands) are public. Data received from the protocol users are secret. The terms AV H are the possible abstractions of terms in the database of THn. They should be mostly self-descriptive. The arguments refer to program points (labels at expressions) where these values have been created. The arguments b also resemble program points -we have mentioned before that we analyse the parts of the protocol following a public-key decryption twice -once assuming that the ciphertext was generated by a protocol participant and once assuming that it was generated by the adversary. Hence, if n public-key decryptions occur before the program point then this point really counts as 2 n different program points for the analysis. If is a program point following n decryptions then b is a bit-string of length n where i-th bit records the assumed creator of the i-th decrypted ciphertext (1 -some honest participant; 0 -the adversary). We call b the decryption context.
The argument i in symkey(i, , b) records the level of the symmetric key. The abstract value symkeyname( , b) corresponds to the identities of the symmetric keys created at the program point (with the decryption context b). According to THn, the adversary is able to find the identities of symmetric keys from the ciphertexts created with them. The abstract value AnyPubVal denotes any value that the adversary knows and may have constructed. All other AV H denote values constructed by protocol participants. The secret decryption keys seckey( , b) are not listed as a possible case for AV H because THn puts severe restrictions on their use -they may only be used for decrypting ciphertexts; they cannot appear as subterms of more complex terms.
Constraint Variables
Given a protocol ℘ with its set of labels, we introduce the following constraint variables.
First, S b for all statement labels occurring in the protocol (here we only consider the labels of if -, let-and receive-statements, not the labels occurring in expressions). Here b is a bit-string whose length equals the number asymmetric decryption operations that occur in the protocol before and including the point labeled with
. Hence for a program point that is preceded by n asymmetric decryptions we have 2 n different variables S b . Let Var
• be the set of variables defined before the protocol point . Let Var
• be the union of Var • with the set of protocol variables that are assigned a value at (depending on whether labels an if -, let-or receive-statement, this set has 0, 1 or 2 elements). ,false for labels at let-and while-statements. They denote whether the true-(default-) and false-branch of the statement are alive or not. The bit-string has the same meaning as before. The possible values of these variables are false and true, ordered by false ≤ true. 
Figure 1: Constraints describing the adversary's power
AV ∈ P ⇒ AV ∼ =P AnyPubVal store(X P ) ∼ =P AnyPubVal ∀i : AV i ∼ =P AV i´∧ (AV 1 , . . . , AV j ) ∼ =P AnyPubVal ⇒ (AV 1, . . . , AV j ) ∼ =P AnyPubVal (AnyPubVal, . . . , AnyPubVal) ∼ =P AnyPubVal AV k ∼ =P AV k ∧ AV t ∼ =P AV t ∧ pubenc(AV k , AV t , , b) ∈ P ⇒ pubenc(AV k , AV t, , b) ∼ =P AnyPubVal AV k ∼ =P AV k ∧ AV t ∼ =P AV t ∧ symenc(AV k , AV t , , b) ∈ P ⇒ symenc(AV k , AV t, , b) ∼ =P AnyPubVal X S ∼ =P X P
Constraints
There are two sources for constraints -the protocol and the adversary. The first describes the movement of values during the computations performed by the protocol, while the second describes the capabilities of the adversary in decomposing messages. This second set of constraints, given in Fig. 1 is quite straightforward: The first two constraints are obvious -the adversary can retrieve stored payloads and decompose lists. The third constraint states that the adversary can decrypt a symmetric encryption if it has the key. The relation ∼ =P relates two abstract values if the sets of terms they correspond to may intersect. Because the meaning of AnyPubVal depends on the adversary's knowledge, this relation must also depend on it. The relation ∼ =P is the least reflexive, symmetric and structure-respecting relation on abstract values that satisfies the conditions given in Fig. 2 . The fourth constraint for the adversary's capabilities states that if the public key used for public encryption may have been created by the adversary (which means that the secret key was also created by the adversary) then the adversary may find out the plaintext. The fifth and sixth constraints state that the adversary is capable of determining the identity of the key used to produce the ciphertext. For asymmetric encryption, this identity is the public key itself, while for symmetric encryption, it is the symkeyname. Finally, the public values X P and AnyPubVal may be known to the adversary.
The set of constraints generated by an input or output process P is given by the mapping P that we are going to define below. For defining it, we also define the following mappings.
• e (I, b) gives the set of abstract values for the result of evaluating the expression e when the decryption context (after evaluating e) is b and the abstractions of already defined variables are given by the mapping I.
• e s(I) and e f (I) give some necessary conditions for the evaluation of e to succeed or fail.
• e E (I, L) gives the set of constraints for the variables E b , as generated by e. Here L is a boolean showing whether this expression is live code.
• x := e (b, X, y), where X gives the abstractions of variables defined before the assignment x := e, and y is either x or a variable occurring in e gives a set of abstract values that certainly abstracts the value of y after the successful evaluation of e. The mapping x := e is used to collect the relationships between values of variables.
The relationships between variables allow us to make the analysis more precise -they bound the abstractions of values of variables from above. When combining several of these upper bounds, we have to form their greatest lower bound. While the least upper bound of two sets of abstract values may be just the union of sets, the greatest lower bound cannot be simply the intersection because when two sets of abstract values A and B are both valid abstractions of some concrete value then we want their greatest lower bound A∩B be a valid abstraction of that value as well. But certain concrete values may correspond to several different abstract values, for example a nonce that has become known to the adversary may occur in our abstractions either as nonce( , b) for some and b or as AnyPubVal. For defining∩, we first define a partial binary operation on abstract values as the smallest (i.e. defined for as few arguments as possible) idempotent symmetric structure-preserving operation that satisfies AV H AnyPubVal = AV H for any abstract value AV H defined in (1). Now we can just define A∩ B = {AV AV | AV ∈ A, AV ∈ B}. We also define A⊆ B iff A∩ B = A.
The mappings e , e s, e f and e E are given in Figures 3  and 4 . If we have left out the definition of e s or e f for some e then it is true. If we have left out the definition of e E for some e then it is ∅. In Fig. 4 , La [resp. Ls] denotes the set of all labels occurring in the protocol in the positions keypair [resp. gen symenc key(i) ]. In Fig. 3 we can see the special treatment of AnyPubVal -for example, payloads can be extracted from it and projections can be taken. The result is still a public value. During encryption, AnyPubVal may serve as the encryption key (of course, such ciphertexts can be decrypted by the adversary). During decryption, when the ciphertext is AnyPubVal, we use the variables E b to determine the possible plaintexts. The distinction between participant-generated and adversarially generated ciphertexts in public-key decryption can be seen in two definitions for pubdec(x k , xt) . First of them assumes that the ciphertext is generated by some protocol participant, while the second assumes that the adversary is the source of the ciphertext. Both of these cases are also present in symmetric decryption, but they have been joined together, so that the analysis does not handle them separately.
The relationships between newly defined and existing variables are given by x := e (b, X, y), defined in Fig. 5 . Recall that it gives for a variable y a set of abstract values that is guaranteed to 
Figure 4: Abstract semantics of expressions: mappings e s, e f and e E abstract its concrete value. If the definition is missing for some x := e (b, X, y) in Fig. 5 , it is equal to X(y) (i.e. no precision is gained). In Fig. 5 , the message constructor C may be one of list, pubenc or privenc . The corresponding abstract value constructor C is then either the list constructor, pubenc(·, ·, , b) or privenc (·, ·, , b) .
The usage of x := e may become clearer when we look at
Figure 5: Constraints giving the relationships between values of variables
the constraints generated by processes. This generation is done by P (I, b, L, C) where I is a constraint variable describing the protocol state before the execution of the process P , the bitstring b is the current decryption context, the variable L denotes whether this process is alive, and C is a set of constraints of the form X(x)⊆ E where E is a monotone expression with respect to X that evaluates to a set of abstract values. The constraints in C relate the abstract values of variables that have been defined before the execution of P . If C contains a constraint X(x)⊆ E then the result of E is a suitable abstraction for the value of x. Let R be a mapping from variables to sets of abstract values, and let C be a set of constraints in the form X(x)⊆ E. We let L(R, C) denote the greatest solution to the constraints C (with X as the variable) that is less than or equal to R. The mapping P is given in Fig. 6 .
Let us explain the generated constraints. For an assignment, the If e is a not a public-key decryption then
,false , C) If e is a public-key decryption then ,true is true then we let the mapping R b be (at least) the mapping I, but additionally we fix the abstraction of the left-hand side y. Here this "at least" means "equal to" because there will be no other constraints for
,true is false then R b has no constraints, hence it maps everything to ∅. The set of constraints C b includes all the relationships between variables that are defined up to the successful execution of y := e. Note that the inequality signs in the constraints in C b has the opposite direction from the inequality signs in the constraints generated by
b contains basically the same abstractions as R b , but all recorded relationships between variables have been taken into account. As this constraint is the only one for S b , the inequality S b ≤ R b always holds.
We also add the constraints for the variables E b and we recursively invoke · for the default-and the false-branch. The arguments for these recursive calls are also worth noting. We see that as we pass through the protocol, we collect the constraints expressing the relationships between variables. For the default-branch, S b is the abstraction of the initial state, while for the false-branch, the same mapping I is used because no variable was assigned to if the evaluation of e failed. Also we collect no new relationships between variables if e fails (although it would be possible for some e, we have found that it does not change the precision of the analysis in practice).
If e is a public-key decryption then we have "two different defaultbranches", with decryption contexts b1 and b0. These two defaultbranches are reflected in the variables R b1 , S b1 , R b0 , S b0 , as well as in two invocations of · for the default-branch P .
Consider now other cases for the process P . In an if-statement we check whether the abstractions of x and x may intersect. We also add the equality of x and x to the set of constraints C .
A send-command always succeeds, the intended recipient becomes known to the adversary and the message is recorded as occurring on the channel c and/or becoming known to the adversary.
In a receive-statement (no matter whether replicated or not), a message from the adversary is abstracted as AnyPubVal and a message from the user as a secret payload. The sender of the message is already known to the adversary, hence xp is a public integer. No new constraints are added, hence the invocation of L is not needed for S b . If Ii is the program for the machine Pi then the set of constraints for the protocol is the union of Ii ({}, ε, true, ∅) over all i, where {} is the mapping with empty domain. Together with the constraints in Fig. 1 , they make up the entire constraint system that we have to solve.
Suppose that we have solved the constraint system for some protocol ℘. Let be a label occurring in this protocol (labeling a subprocess P ). Let I b denote the variable S b (or the empty mapping) that occurs as the first argument in the call P (I, b, L, C), invoked during the construction of constraints for ℘. That is, I
b gives the abstract values of variables before entering the subprocess labeled with in the context b.
The following theorem states how the security of a protocol can be established using our analysis. (III) X S ∈ P.
(IV) If AV ∈ E b and a symm. key of order i is generated at then the order of AV is less than i.
• 
IMPLEMENTATION
We find the (componentwise) least solution for the aforementioned collection of inequalities. The least fixed point is computed iteratively, using a version of the solver from [24] , which is specifically tailored to systems of constraints. The computation might not terminate but we believe that this is not a problem for real protocols; in fact, we have never encountered this situation when we applied our tool to common protocols of the literature. The only case in which computation is not guaranteed to terminate is if the protocol is able to create terms of arbitrary complexity all by itself, without the help from the adversary. We also believe that the potentially exponential number of variables in the size of the protocol is not a problem in practice because protocol descriptions are short.
There are ways to deal with the divergence of the fixed-point computation (add suitable widenings). Also, we believe that the exponential number of sets can be represented in a more compact way, if necessary.
The value of L(R, C) is also computed iteratively, using the same solution method. The mapping X is initialized with R and the iteration proceeds downwards.
The constraint generator and solver have been implemented in O'Caml (version 3.09 was used to compile it to native code). We have tested the analyser on several protocols from the literature, namely Needham-Schroeder public key [42] , its fix by Lowe [38] , Otway-Rees [43] , Yahalom, and its modification by Burrows et. al [17] . The goal of all these protocols is to exchange a symmetric key between two parties. We use our analysis to find out whether it is safe to use the exchanged key to protect secret payloads in transit over public networks. We have thus added an extra message at the end of the protocol sessions in all of these protocols. This extra message contains a secret payload encrypted under the freshly exchanged key. (Note again that we do not consider real-or-random secrecy of the keys in this paper, but secrecy of the (encrypted) payloads.) Our analysis considers all these protocols secure, except for the original (and indeed flawed) Needham-Schroeder protocol. If one allows old session keys to become known to the adversary, there may be attacks that are not discovered by our analyser since the BPW model does not consider the leakage of secret keys that have been used (this would cause a so-called commitment problem which makes a proof of computational soundness in the sense of BRSIM/UC impossible). Problems with the Needham-SchroederLowe and the modified Yahalom protocol have been published [19, 49] but these problems do not affect payload secrecy propertiesthey do not allow an adversary to learn the new key or inject its own key which could then be used to learn information on the payload. The running times of the analyser on a computer with 1 GHz Intel Celeron processor and 256 MB of main memory are between one and eight seconds for these protocols with less than two seconds for Needham-Schroeder-Lowe and both versions of Yahalom.
CORRECTNESS OF THE ANALYSIS
Theorem 1 is a straightforward corollary of a lemma similar to subject reduction. We are going to give the statement of that lemma here, its proof can be found in the full version of this paper [7] .
When arguing about the correctness, we need to distinguish public and secret payloads. Hence we change the semantics of the system a little bit and assume that each payload is labeled with its secrecy level. An integer received from the protocol user is labeled as secret; a constant integer or the apparent sender of some message is labeled as public. When the payloads are stored in the database of terms then the labels are stored as well. They are also retrieved together with labels. When two integers are compared their secrecy levels are ignored.
Let R be a run of the protocol (a finite sequence of steps). Let O be the state of the database of THn at the end of this run. Let x be a protocol variable whose definition occurs under k replications. If the variable x has been assigned a value inside the i1-th replica of the outermost replication, i2-th replica of the next replication, etc., then we denote this value O(x, [i1, . . . , i k ] ). This value is either a handle to a term in O, a secret integer, or a public integer. Similarly, if a program point inside k replications and (syntactically) preceded by n public-key decryptions then let O( , [i1, . . . , i k ]) be the n-bit string whose bits describe the source of n ciphertexts whose decryptions are visible at the point in the replica [i1, . . . , i k ]. Note that a ciphertext is a term in the database O and its creator is simply the first principal that had a handle to it.
For a set T of terms in the database O we let its downwards closure T be the smallest set of terms containing T and being closed with respect to list projection, decryption with keys in T, and extracting the public keys and symmetric key names from ciphertexts. For an abstract value AV we define its semantics [[AV ]] O with respect to the contents of the database O. The semantics is either a set of terms in O or a set of payloads.
•
• [[store (AV ) LetP be the largest set thatP ⊆ P\{AnyPubVal} and (AV 1, . . . , AV j ) ∈P implies AV i ∈P for 1 ≤ i ≤ j. Informally,P is obtained from P by deleting AnyPubVal and also any abstract value that is a list, one of whose components (after flattening lists) is AnyPubVal. The setP is a better characterization than P for the set of terms created by honest participants and learned by the adversary. Definition 1. A term T from the downwards closure of the set of all terms known to the adversary is adversarially well-constructed with respect to P if one of the following holds:
• ∃AV ∈P, such that T ∈ [[AV ]] O .
• All immediate subterms of T (the immediate subterm of a public key or a symmetric key name is the corresponding secret key) are known to the adversary and are also adversarially well-constructed. Also, if T is of type nonce, ske, enc, garbage, skse, symenc then T must have been constructed by the adversary.
That is, a term is adversarially well-constructed if the adversary knows how to construct this term from the terms that the analysis has found him to know. The lemma is proved by induction over the length of R.
LEMMA 2 (SUBJECT REDUCTION
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